DIVESTITURE II: IS THE LOCAL LOOP RIPE FOR
COMPETITION?
Samuel F. Cullari

In 1975 the Department of Justice ("DOJ") began an antitrust action that ultimately resulted in the
divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies
("BOCs") from AT&T.' Divestiture created a structure for the telephone industry, which aside from recent changes, still exists in 1995.2 However, in the
age of competition, the dividing lines drawn by the
Modified Final Judgment ("MFJ") may be obsolete. MFJ restrictions prohibit local exchange carriers ("LECs") from offering interLATA' or interexchange telephone service. Likewise, AT&T, the
dominant interexchange carrier ("IXC"), is restricted from providing traditional wireline local telephone exchange service.4 Divestiture and the resulting regulations did not solely affect AT&T and the

BOCs. The separation of the BOCs from AT&T
created an environment in which a smaller, less
powerful company could challenge AT&T for its
long distance market share.5 For the first time, competition in the long distance telephone industry was
possible. MCI became AT&T's first true competitor,' followed soon after by companies, such as
Sprint and LDDS.' While AT&T currently holds
the majority share of the long distance telephone
market, its share has dropped to a historically low
level in recent years.'
Similarities between AT&T's past battles with
MCI and the current battles between the Regional
Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs") and their
competitors have prompted commentary on the pos-

United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir.
1982), aftd sub. nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983). The original action was an antitrust suit filed in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in November, 1975. Id. In the suit, the DOJ sought an injunction to stop
AT&T's monopolistic activities and AT&T's divestiture of the
Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs"), Bell Labs, and Western
Electric. David A. Irwin, Court Decisions: AT&T/Dept. of
Justice Settlement, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REG. MON., Nov.
1988, at 2-15. The case resulted in a settlement between the
DOJ and AT&T known as the 1982 Consent Decree. Id. The
1982 Consent Decree was later modified and affirmed by Judge
Harold H. Greene, and became known as the Modified Final
Judgment ("MFJ"). The MFJ modified a 1956 consent decree
limiting AT&T to regulated common carrier services. United
States v. Western Electric Co., Civil Action No. 17-49, C.A. 820192 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
2
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 131. The MFJ separated the
BOCs from AT&T and created seven separate and independent
Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs"): NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Bell Atlantic, SouthWestern Bell, U S West, Ameritech, and BellSouth. The seven RBOCs now own and control
the twenty-two BOCs that existed before Divestiture under
AT&T. See Irwin, supra note 1. However, other communications companies such as GTE and Airtouch have become powerful players in the local telephone market. See e.g., Airtouch Disputes
Claim That It
Is BOC 'Successor',
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS, Feb. 20, 1995, at 23-24.
' AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 131. LATAs are Local Access
Transport Areas. LATAs are the contiguous geographical areas

which the BOCs are restricted to for the provision of local exchange telephone service. Irwin, supra note 1, at 2-17 - 2-18.
LATAs define areas of common interest in which the BOCs are
permitted to provide intraLATA or local telephone service. Id.
InterLATA and long distance service is restricted to interexchange carriers ("IXCs") such as AT&T. Id. at 2-19.
" AT&T has re-entered the local exchange market through
cellular telephone service. See, e.g., Edward Warner, With Conditions, Greene Gives AT&T Waiver To Buy McCaw, FCC
REPORT, Sept. 8, 1994, at 7. In 1994, AT&T purchased McCaw Cellular one of the largest cellular phone carriers in the
nation. AT&T's purchase of McCaw was opposed by the DOJ
on the grounds that AT&T needed to obtain a waiver of the
1982 consent decree before re-entering the local exchange market. Id.
' Harold H. Greene, AT&T Divestiture and Consumers, 5
U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 251, 252 (1984). Prior to Divestiture,
AT&T had the ability to prevent competitors from gaining market share in the telecommunications market through cross-subsidization. Id. at 253. By raising prices in the local exchange market, where it held a monopoly, AT&T could afford to drop its
long distance prices lower than the amount that smaller companies could afford to drop their prices and still operate. This
"predatory pricing" effectively ran competitors out of business.
6 See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d
365 (D.C. Cir. 1977)[hereinafter Execunet I].
See, e.g., LDDS Joins "Big Three" to Make "Big Four",
COMM. DAILY, Feb. 2, 1995, at 3.
a Id.
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sibility of "Divestiture II."' Much like MCI's presence in the late seventies and early eighties, the presence of competition in the local telephone exchange
market is causing regulators to re-evaluate the "natural monopoly" status of local telephone service.
Competitive access providers ("CAPs") and other
competitors such as cellular, new wireless technologies and cable are competing for areas of the LECs'
market in the local exchanges.' The success of these
competitors spurred the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") and legislators to consider the advantages of competition in the
local exchange market."
This Comment addresses the benefits and
problems competition in the local exchange market
creates for the industry, legislators, and regulators.
Part I explains the development of the local telephone industry after the MFJ. Part II introduces
the LECs' competitors and their significance to the
local exchange market. Part III outlines recent industry, regulatory, and legislative movements in relation to local exchange service. Part IV analyzes the
effects of new state and federal regulatory initiatives
and the proposed telecommunications legislation on
the local market. This Comment concludes that federal, legislative reform is necessary to control competition in the local loop and to meet the public
interest.
I. THE MFJ: BACKGROUND OF THE LOCAL LOOP
In the early 1900s, it became evident to regulators
'

See, e.g., Paul Keleher, Local Exchange Competition: Are

Users Ready for Another Divestiture?, TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
Dec. 1994, at 45. The term "Divestiture II" is actually a misnomer used to refer to the RBOCs restructuring in order to accommodate competition in the local market and removal of MFJ
line of business restrictions rather than a government action divesting the BOCs from the RBOCs.
'0 Currently, most CAPs merely provide alternative access to
IXCs. However many CAPs are expanding to offer alternatives
to other LEC offerings. See Joseph S. Kraemer, Local Competition; Changing Ground Rules for Network Access, Bus. COMMUNICATIONS REV., Sept. 1994, at 4. Cable companies have

made alliances which could result in dangerous local telephone
competitors. See infra, § II B.
" See Reed Hundt, Toward Regulation that Fosters Competition, 39 FED. COM. L.J. 265 (1994)(Special Issue on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Communications Act of 1934).
1"

See Kenneth A. Cox & William J. Byrnes, Title II The

Common Carrier Provisions-A Product of Evolutionary Devel-

opment, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
" For the purpose of simplicity, the term "AT&T" is used
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that AT&T, under the leadership of company president Theodore Vail, was attempting to create a monopoly in the telephone market.1" In 1913, the DOJ
and AT&T 1 entered into the Kingsbury Commitment ("the Commitment"). 4 Under the Commitment, AT&T agreed to divest the recently acquired
Western Union, stop buying independent telephone
companies, and allow full interconnection with independent telephone companies." The Kingsbury
Commitment was ineffective in curtailing AT&T's
construction of a telephone monopoly. AT&T had
already established market dominance and was able
to underprice all of its competitors."'
In 1956, a second DOJ attempt to control AT&T
culminated in a consent decree that limited AT&T
to providing regulated telecommunications services. 7
AT&T's market power also made this agreement of
limited value in curtailing its development of a monopoly. However, in 1982, a DOJ antitrust action
begun nearly a decade earlier produced the 1982
consent decree and shortly thereafter the MFJ.1
Under the MFJ, AT&T agreed to divest itself of the
BOCs and function independently in the interexchange market.1 9
Pursuant to the 1982 consent decree, seven Regional Bell Operating Companies were formed.2
The seven RBOCs now own and operate the twentytwo BOCs."1 The MFJ imposed restrictions on the
BOCs' provision of interLATA and interexchange
services. It required the BOCs to provide equal access to their networks for both IXCs and enhanced
service providers ("ESPs").22 The MFJ also prohibited BOCs from providing information services and
throughout this comment to refer to not only the modern corporation but also the early Bell System.
1
Cox & Byrnes, supra note 12, at 49.
15 Id. at 49 n. 182.
'e
Cox & Byrnes, supra note 12, at 49.
'.

552 F. Supp at 135-36.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 139.

19

Id. See also Irwin, supra note 1, at 2-15.

'

,o AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 142 n. 41. Although the decree
did not assign names to the seven RBOCs, as of April 1995, the
names of the RBOCs were, Ameritech, Pacific Telesis, Bell At-

lantic, BellSouth, Southwestern Bell, NYNEX and U S West.
IId.

Id. See also California v. FCC, 104 F.C.C.2d 958

(1986)(Computer III)(modifying In re Amendment of Section
64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), (Computer 11) to remove struc-

tural separation requirements where a BOC sought to provide
information services). The Computer series of cases attempts to
define the line between "information services" as defined by the
MFJ and "enhanced services" as defined by the Commission. Id.
The court in Computer III held that the two categories over-

DIVESTITURE H

19951

manufacturing telecommunications products.and
cus2
tomer premises equipment ("CPE").

3

While the BOCs were restricted to a highly regulated market, AT&T was allowed to enter into lines
of business they had previously been prohibited from
entering.2" However, AT&T's provision of telecommunications service was restricted to the interexchange market. In 1971, the Commission decided
that new carriers could enter into the interexchange
market.25 Pursuant to this decision, MCI filed for
permission to provide microwave communications
services that would compete with AT&T's Message
Telephone Service ("MTS") and Wide Area Telecommunications Service ("WATS"). 6 AT&T opposed MCI's application arguing that MCI's tariff
revisions were in violation of the Specialized Common CarrierDecision. In Execunet I,27 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") held that MCI could provide voice telephone service via microwave transmission."8 The D.C. Circuit held that in order for the
FCC to restrict MCI from providing such service the
Commission must find that such a ruling would be
in the interest of public convenience and necessity.
Despite this ruling, AT&T refused to provide MCI
with the interconnections necessary to provide the
voice telephone service. 9 In Execunet II,' ° the D.C.
Circuit once again held in MCI's favor, ordering
AT&T to provide interconnection for MCI's private
line and long distance services."

Soon after the Execunet I & II decisions, the
Commission found that competition in the long distance market was in the public interest." The MFJ
mandated that the BOCs provide equal access to all
IXCs.38 The BOCs are permitted to charge the
IXCs access fees for interconnection to their networks. This results in the proverbial "bottleneck,"
which is so often referred to in local exchange service."' Until recently, the IXCs had no choice but to
deal with the BOCs. The local loop was exactly
what the Commission and the court had expected it
to be at the time of Divestiture, a monopoly controlled by the BOCs."5
II. LEC COMPETITORS
STRATEGIES

AND

THEIR

Recent changes in the telecommunications industry have made it impossible for LECs to ignore the
threat of competition in the local exchange. The success of CAPs, the FCC's attempt to forward competition through collocation, 6 and the threat of wireless technologies, such as cellular and Personal
Communications Services ("PCS"), illustrate that
7
competition in the local exchange is a reality.

A.

Competitive Access Providers

CAPs, usually fiber-based carriers, connect endusers directly to IXCs or other locations, such as

lapped, "but may not be identical." Id. at 962. Some examples of
"enhanced service" providers are Compuserve, Prodigy, and
America Online. The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded the
Computer III decision in California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th

Execunet 11] (holding that the decision to allow MCI to provide
private line and interexchange service in Execunet I was based
in part on the fact that AT&T would be required to provide
access to its facilities; therefore AT&T could not subsequently

Cir. 1990).

refuse to provide such access).
80 Id. at 590.
31 Id. at 596-97.
31 In re Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone

AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 186-93.
IId. at 178-86. However, AT&T was restricted from entering electronic publishing for at least seven years. Id.
8'
In re Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Application to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C. 2d 870, 920
(1971)[hereinafter Specialized Common CarrierDecision]. "We
further find and conclude that a general policy in favor of the
entry of new carriers in the specialized communications field
would serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity." Id.
86
MCI v. FCC,561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter
88

Execunet 1] (holding that the FCC made no public interest determination that MCI could not provide voice telephone service).
MTS is long distance telephone service in which the IXC
charges the customer per message, based on the time of day, distance of the call, or length of the call. Id. WATS is discount,
bulk-rate long distance service that IXCs offer to high volume
customers. Id.
27

Id. at 365.

28

Id. at 370.

'9 MCI v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978)[hereinafter

Company Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 7369, para. 2 (1992).[hereinafter Expanded Interconnection I].
33 See In re Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 6
FCC Rcd. 3259 (1991)[hereinafter Expanded Interconnection]
(ordering LECs to supply equal access to all, but allowing
BOCs to use AT&T where a customer did not express a preference for any particular long distance carrier).
8'
Gail Garfield Schwartz & Jeffrey H. Hoagg, Virtual Divestiture: Structural Reform of an RHC, 44 FED. COM. L.J.
285, 286-88 (1991).
88
Id.
$1 Expanded Interconnection II, supra note 32, para. 270.

(requiring physical collocation as the means by which LECs
must allow CAPs to interconnect into LEC Central Offices).
87
Kraemer, supra note 10, at 5-6.
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other LEC Central Offices ("COs"), in competition
with the access services and network service offerings
of LECs. 8 CAPs usually target large commercial
customers and seek to bypass their area LEC either
by interconnection directly to an IXC or to another
LEC. s8 The BOCs are the largest group of LECs.
They have the most metropolitan business and therefore stand to lose the most to CAPs.
Many IXCs use CAPs to diversify their networks.
CAPs provide an opportunity for an IXC to bypass
LEC access charges which often are an IXC's greatest expense. 0 This also gives IXCs leverage in their
ongoing battle to force the LECs to reduce access
charges. 4 ' LECs' access charges are extremely important to their cost structure. A loss in these revenues could cause a LEC to reduce investment in research, development and implementation of new
technologies. 42 If LECs are forced to reduce investment in research and development, their competitors
will reap a strong advantage because most are constructing their facilities with the latest technologies.
Aside from offering diversification to the IXCs
and commercial end-users, CAPs are usually ten-totwenty percent cheaper than the LECs in providing
comparable services. 43 This is due in part to the regulatory restrictions that affect LECs, but not CAPs.
LECs are often the "carrier of last resort." 44 They
are therefore required to offer services to all subscribers in their service area including high-cost lowreturn users.4 5 This is a financial burden with which
CAPs do not have to cope.
Teleport Communications Group ("TCG") and
other large CAPs envision themselves offering more
8

Id. at 6.

80 Id.
40 Id. See also John S, Harrison, The Information Superhighway; Assault on a Stronghold, FORTNIGHTLY, June 15,
1994, at 38, 39. (stating that LEC access charges are often arbitrary, varying drastically from one LEC to another for the same
type of access).
41
Kraemer, supra note 10, at 6.
Id.
42
42
Id.
-4 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1988) provides: "Itshall be the duty of
every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such communication service
upon reasonable request therefor .
46 47 U.S.C. § 202 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any
unjust and unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services for
or in connection with like communication service, directly
or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or give
any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to
any particular person, class of persons, or locality or to
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services than the typical alternative access to IXCs
and LEC COs. CAPs want to become "the other local phone company."" 6 TCG has telecommunications
networks in nineteen major markets and is constructing networks in five additional markets. 47 In the
summer of 1994, TCG entered into a ground breaking agreement with NYNEX in which the two
agreed to interconnect their networks and exchange
local telephone traffic.4 8 This agreement makes TCG
the first CAP to be treated as an equal by an
RBOC.49 While TCG has been able to make great
strides toward supplying a full service telecommunications network to customers in New York, it is definitely the exception to the rule. New York was the
first state to allow competition into the local exchange telephone market."0 While other states are
beginning to follow New York's lead, New York
City remains the only major city to allow local exchange competition.51
Cable as a Local Exchange Competitor

B.

Cable companies are another potential competitor
for the LECs. Since 1984, cable's penetration rate
has grown significantly. At the end of 1993, approxi52
mately sixty million households received cable.
Some cable companies are already involved in the
provision of telecommunications services. TCG is
owned by a consortium of cable companies, including
Cox Cable and TCI. 5s The merger of a cable com-

pany with a CAP results in an entity that, theoretically, could cover a LEC's subscriber area, providing
access to the IXC POP without utilizing the LEC
subject any particular person, class of persons, or locality
to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.
Keleher, supra note 9, at 47.
Teleport Communications Group Deplores Ameritech's
Latest Reciprocal Compensation Proposal, FINANCIAL NEWS,
Jan. 10, 1995, at 2. TCG opposed Ameritech's proposal on the
46

47

ground that waiver of the 1982 Consent Decree restrictions for
Ameritech should not be attached to opening the local exchange
to competition.
Keleher, supra note 9, at 48 (showing TCG's relationship
46
with NYNEX as the most advanced CAP/LEC relationship in
the country).

9 Id. at 49. NYNEX has issued TCG its own NXX or exchange identifiers and has agreed to treat TCG's customers
equal to its own customers.
" Schwartz & Hoagg, supra note 34, at 319-24 (discussing
the reform of NYNEX and the New York local telephone exchange as a model).
5'
Keleher, supra note 9, at 48-49.
Kraemer, supra note 10, at 6-7.
62
Harrison, supra note 40, at 39.
62
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facilities.5 ' This possibility combined with the facts
that cable companies target residential areas and
CAPs target large businesses, make a CAP/cable
merger a formidable competitor in the local loop.
However, most cable companies' current network
architecture, which is designed for video transmission, would not be able to support two way voice and
data communications even if they had the switching
that they currently lack. 55 The cable companies
would have to alter their systems and run fiber,
which could prove to be too expensive to make the
transformation worthwhile.
C. Wireless Technologies: Competition from the
Future
Wireless communications systems also present
competition for LECs. Cellular Telephone Networks
("Cellular") are currently strong competitors in the
local exchange market for a number of reasons. Cellular systems offer expanded calling areas sometimes
encompassing an entire LATA.5 6 The incredible
growth rate and increasing popularity of cellular,
since its inception in 1984, have made it possible for
cellular companies to lower rates while expanding
calling areas. "7 In some instances it is possible for a
cellular carrier to provide what normally would be
an interLATA toll call without an additional per
minute charge. 8
Currently, LECs benefit in part from cellular and
wireless use. Since most wireless calls either originate or terminate from wireline end-users, traffic on
landline local exchange systems is increased." However, with the advent of radio based PCS on the horizon, many IXCs and cable companies are viewing
wireless systems as an alternative to LECs for access
54

Id.

55

Id.

"

Kraemer, supra note 10, at 7-8.

57

Id.

"

Id.

59

Id.

Terence L. Barnich & Craig L. Clausen, Pulling the
"Reverse Trigger": A Way to Define Local Competition, FORTNIGHTLY, June 15, 1994, at 34.
"1 See Warner, supra note 4, at 7.
62
Kraemer, supra note 10, at 6.
03 Expanded Interconnection, supra note 33, paras. 19-20.
"
David A. Irwin, It's Not Paranoia- Competition is Com60

ing to Your Local Exchange, ROUNDTABLE, Fall 1993.
" See Expanded Interconnection, supra note 33, paras. 1920 (1991).
66 Id.
17
Id. These devices are used to send multiple signals over a
single circuit and distinguish between those signals once they

to the local exchange. 60 Both Sprint and AT&T
have merged with and acquired cellular phone companies, respectively, and both have to bid for PCS
licenses."1
III. INDUSTRY, REGULATORY AND LEGTOWARDS
INITIATIVES
ISLATIVE
COMPETITION
A.

Collocation

Some CAPs compete with LECs for the transport
of regular switched long distance calls between either
the end-user and the LEC CO, or between the LEC
CO and the point of presence ("POP") of an IXC.6 2
These services require direct connection to the LEC
with which the CAP is competing. This interconnection raises the issue of collocation."a Connections that
require access to the LEC CO are crucial in the provision of interstate long distance network access.6 '
There are two methods for the interconnection of
CAPs to LEC COs: physical collocation and virtual
collocation.65
To achieve physical collocation, the interconnecting party, i.e. the CAP, usually leases a space inside
the LEC CO. The interconnecting party places the
equipment it needs to terminate transmissions in that
space.6 6 Typical termination devices are multiplexers, demultiplexers and digital cross connect
switches.6" The LEC allows the employees of the interconnecting party to have access to the LEC CO to
install and maintain its equipment. This method of
connection has raised questions of space availability,
security, and ultimately, the constitutional rights of
the LEC. 8
To achieve virtual collocation, the interconnecting
reach there destination. This expands the overall capacity of a
telecommunications network.
"s Expanded Interconnection II, supra note 32, paras. 22740. LECs claimed that the Commission's requirement that
LECs allow CAPs to physically collocate in the LECs' COs constituted an unlawful taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Id. para. 227. The Commission argued that the physical collocation requirement was not a
taking due to the Commission's specific authority under section
201(a) of the Communications Act to order common carriers to
establish physical connections. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988). The
Commission also argued that since it had proposed a compensation system by which LECs would be compensated for CAPs use
of LEC facilities there would be no Fifth Amendment violation
even if there was a taking. Expanded Interconnection II, supra,
para. 238. However, in Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC, 24
F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994) the D.C. Circuit found that the
FCC's authority under section 201(a) of the Act did not expressly authorize orders of physical collocation. Id.
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party connects with a LEC CO from an adjacent location, such as a nearby office space or manhole.69
Virtual collocation differs from physical collocation
in that any equipment located on the LEC CO
premises is owned or leased by the LEC. The employees of the interconnecting party have no entry
rights into the LEC CO.The LEC is responsible for
maintaining the equipment."0 The interconnecting
party chooses the type of equipment to be used and,
in some instances, is the party leasing the equipment
to the LEC. 71 In an ideal virtual collocation agreement, the LEC and the interconnecting party negotiate price arrangements to more closely approximate
the results that physical collocation would produce72
In 1992, the FCC ordered LECs to provide expanded interconnection to their networks for interstate special access.7 This order facilitated CAPs'
provision of special access long distance services. 4
In the same order, the Commission attempted to
mandate physical collocation as the means for the
LECs to provide interconnection to their competitors. 7' However, in Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos. v.
FCC,78 the D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC order
mandating physical collocation. The court applied
strict scrutiny in assessing the FCC's authority to require the LECs to give up space in their COs and
found that the Communications Act of 1934 ("the
Act") did not grant the Commission specific authority to require physical collocation.7 8 The FCC order,
intended to enhance competition, excused physical
collocation in only two circumstances: 1) where the
floor space in the LEC CO would not accommodate
physical collocation; or 2)where state regulatory pol7
icy favored virtual collocation.

9

The Commission contended that it had the power
to order physical collocation under section 201(a) of
the Act, which empowers the FCC to order carriers
to "establish physical connections with other carri"

Expanded Interconnection, supra note 33, para. 20.

70

Id.

71

Id. paras. 20-22.
Id. paras. 23-26.
I,

Expanded Interconnection II, supra note 32, para. 29.
7, Expanded Interconnection, supra note 33, paras. 13-16.
78

"
7e

77
78

70
80

Expanded Interconnection II, supra note 33, para. 270.
24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Id. at 1446.
Id. at 1446-47.

Bell Atlantic, 24 F.3d at 1443.
47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).

81 24 F.3d at 1446.
82

Id.

In fact, both NYNEX and Pacific Telesis have chosen to
maintain physical collocation as their means of allowing CAPs
88
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ers." s However, the court held that physical collocation amounted to an allocation of property rights unrelated to "physical connection."'" The court found
that, if implemented, the Commission's order mandating physical collocation would constitute an unconstitutional taking of LEC property in violation of
the Fifth Amendment." In effect, the ruling in Bell
Atlantic gave the LECs a choice whether or not to
allow physical collocation."
In 1993, the Commission ordered LECs providing
expanded interconnection for special access to also
provide expanded interconnection for switched transport service and equal access to the signalling information necessary for switching. 4
On December 15, 1994, virtual collocation replaced physical collocation as the FCC's standard for
required interconnection into the LEC networks. 85
However, in recent filings to the FCC,the two largest CAPs protested LEC interconnection tariffs on
the basis of cost justification and the requirements
that the tariffs imposed on CAPs.8 TCG and Metropolitan Fiber Systems ("MFS") complained that
the LECs were interfering with competition by
keeping prices for CAPs high.8 7 In some cases, prices
for interconnection via virtual collocation were reported in excess of 260% greater than interconnection through physical collocation. 8
As of April 1995, the Commission was awaiting
replies to the CAPs' complaints from the RBOCs
and other LECs. s9 Some of the CAPs' complaints
charge that the RBOCs proposed tariffs are in violation of the Commission order that requires the
LECs' rates for virtual collocation to simulate as
closely as possible the cost of physical collocation."
B.

RBOC Restructuring
The RBOCs are looking to expand their lines of

access to their networks. The two RBOCs maintain they have
done so in the interest of local competition. TCG and MFS
maintain that the RBOCs chose to keep physical collocation because it is more cost efficient for them. See Keleher, supra note
9, at 48.
In re Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone
Company Facilities, 8 FCC Rcd. 7341 (1993). [hereinafter Expanded Interconnection III]
a' Virtual Collocation Rates Hit; Bell Atlantic's Said Worst
of Lot, FCC
86 Id.

REPORT,

Nov. 3, 1994, at 6.

87 David Rohde, Bells Flout Collocation Rules: CAPs Complain, NETWORK WORLD, Oct. 24, 1994, at 38.
8 Id.
89

Id.

90

Id.
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business in response to competition from the CAPs
and other alternative access sources. They are expanding into cable service outside their service areas,
competing directly with RBOCs and LECs in other
telephone service areas, and expanding into new
technologies such as Video Dialtone.9
Ameritech Corporation ("Ameritech") and Frontier Corporation ("Frontier"), formerly Rochester
Telephone Corporation, are planning to restructure
their corporations.9 2 The plans proposed are quid
pro quo arrangements with state and federal regulators. The RBOCs hope to be allowed into businesses
currently restricted to them, such as long distance
service, in exchange for opening up their local loops
to competition.9" Several CAPs have criticized these
plans as RBOC attempts to bargain for something
that is inevitable.94
Ameritech's elaborate restructuring plan proposed
to create twelve individual business units, each dedicated to a specific task.9 6 All of the companies would
work and sell under the single Ameritech name.9
Under Ameritech's proposed regulatory scheme,
competitors would have greater flexibility to install
their own equipment. Rather than unbundling and
offering the package which they now offer to competitors on an individual basis, Ameritech proposed
to make it easier for competitors to come in, set up,
and offer whatever services they could.9" This plan
differs from an Open Network Architecture
("ONA") plan in which the LEC unbundles its service offerings so that a competitor seeking access
could pick and choose what services it needs and is
willing to pay for.9" Ameritech's plan has met with
mixed opinions and approval was still pending with
See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Files Tariffs for Two VDT Systems, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS, Feb. 6, 1995, at 25.
'2 Asking for 'FairFight; Ameritech Proposes Opening Local Loop for Competition, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 23, 1993, at 1;
See also, Compared with Ameritech Plan; Rochester Regulatory
Relief Criticized, COMM. DAILY, Jul. 23, 1993, at 6.
90 See, e.g., Ameritech Proposes Opening Local Loop, supra
note 92, at 1.
" Ameritech Supports Interconnection Proposals, Suggests
Timetable for Unbundling, Presubscription,TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS, Feb. 13, 1995, at 5.
"o The twelve units are: consumer, small business, enhanced
services, customer business, long distance, information services,
telephony, pay phones, advertising, cellular, leasing and network. See FCC Approves Rochester Plan Waivers, Supports Local Competition 'Experiment, Telco Competition Report, Mar.
16, 1995, at 5-7.
"
Id. at 5.
01
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The Commission has proposed Open Network Architec-

ture as a possible way of unbundling LEC services in order to

the FCC as of April 1995.
Until recently, Ameritech argued that the unbundling of their network offerings and a waiver of
the 1982 Consent Decree restrictions banning their
participation in interLATA service, must be
linked.99 In a recent proposed order, however Illinois
Commerce Commission hearing examiners rejected
this notion and proposed a plan for the implementation of local exchange competition in Illinois, which
was not related to the waiver of the 1982 Consent
Decree restrictions. Ameritech supported the
proposal.' 00
Frontier has implemented an unbundling plan of
its own. In an order on November 10, 1994, the
New York Public Service Commission ("PSC")
adopted a Joint Stipulation Agreement ("the Agreement"). 1 ' The Agreement authorized Frontier's
Open Market Plan ("OMP") temporarily as of January 1, 1995.102 Under the agreement, Frontier had
to report to the PSC on February 1, 1995 to show
that the corporation was executing the OMP pursuant to the Agreement. The PSC reserved the right to
alter the Agreement and to revoke it if they find that
Frontier is not executing it in the public interest. 03
The OMP divides Rochester Telephone Corporation into a wholesale and a retail branch. 0 ' R-Net,
the wholesale branch, owns the company's local exchange network and offers exchange access services
previously offered by Rochester Telephone Corporation. R-Com' 0 5 offers local interLATA services at a
retail level through resale of services~ obtained on a
competitive basis from R-Net.' ° Frontier also seeks
admission into the long distance market in light of its
allow competition. See, e.g. Chris L. Kelley, Comment, The
Contestibility of the Local Network: The FCC's Open Network
Architecture Policy, 45 FED. COM. L.J. 89 (1992).
11 See Ameritech Supports Interconnection Proposals, supra
note 94, at 5.
100
101

Id.

In re Petition of Rochester Tel. Corp. for Approval of
Proposed Restructuring Plan, 160 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
554 (N.Y.S.2d Nov. 10, 1994).[hereinafter Rochester Petition].
101
FCC Approves Rochester Plan, supra note 95, at 5-6.
100
The PSC held that local exchange competition was in the
public interest and that if Frontier was not acting in a way that
would hinder competition, the PSC could revoke the Agreement.
Id. at 7.
1'0 See Rochester Petition, supra, note 101, at 554.
100 R-Net and R-Com are not the actual names of the divisions of the corporation. They are titles used by the corporation
in its proposal, and the PSC in the order, for the purpose of
identifying the divisions. The actual names of the divisions may
vary. See Rochester Petition, supra, note 101, at 554.
104

Id. at 556.
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unbundling." °7 AT&T and TCG, along with other
CAPs and IXCs, have expressed concerns that an
FCC decision on this matter is premature. They
stated that there is no evidence as of yet that competition will develop in Frontier's service area.' 08
C.

Legislative Initiatives

While consistently more RBOCs, including Pacific
Telesis and U.S. West, are petitioning state and federal agencies to foster competition in their local exchanges,' 0 9 legislators have begun to formulate plans
to introduce competition into the local loop.'1 0 Many
states have taken New York and Illinois' lead and
have changed their telecommunications legislation.
Virginia and California recently passed bills that
will open their local telephone markets to competition in 1996 and 1997, respectively." 1
However, partially due to strong opposition on the
part of the RBOCs, telecommunications legislation
has met great resistance on the federal level.1 12 At
the end of 1994, despite strong support from many
in the industry, including the Chairman of the FCC
and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications,"' Congress failed to pass Communications Reform Bills S.1822 and H.R. 3626.4 Many
viewed the death of these bills as a significant victory
for the RBOCs over competitors in the local exchange market. 1 The subsequent change in Congress to a Republican majority served to deepen the
discouragement, felt by proponents of telecommunications reform.11 ' However, predictions that Republican majority leaders would put telecommunications
reform on a back burner have been proven wrong117
Senator Larry Pressler, Chairman of the Senate
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
released a draft of his proposed "TelecommunicaId.
... AT&T Unhappy with Rochester Open Market Plan,
COMM. DAILY, Mar. 7, 1995, at 1.
109
See, e.g., Colorado Consumer Office Withdraws from U
S West Settlement Pact, TELCO COMPETITION REPORT, Mar.
30, 1995, at 10; Pacific Telesis Requests InterLATA Relief,;
California Moves Toward Competition by 1997, TELCO COMPETITION REPORT, Feb. 16, 1995, at 7.
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See Hundt, supra note 11, at 265.
Id. at 265-66.

112 Id. at 270. (discussing the consequences of the lack of
effective telecommunications legislation on the development of
competition in the local loop).
,
See infra, note 139.
'l,
11

,

Hundt, supra note 11, at 266.

Id.

Id.

[Vol. 3

tions Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995"
("1995 Act") in early February. The 1995 Act lays
out rules for the introduction of competition into the
local exchange market."' Under the 1995 Act,
RBOCs would be required to form a separate subsidiary for the purpose of entering into lines of business currently prohibited to them." 9 RBOCs would
be allowed to enter in-region interexchange service
three years after enactment of the bill. They could
provide interLATA service and out of region interexchange service after one year. The RBOCs would
be permitted to enter into equipment manufacturing
three years after the enactment of the bill. 2 0
Before an RBOC could begin providing interLATA service, it would have to submit a detailed
application to the Commission. 21 The Commission
would review the applications on the basis of
whether or not the service would be in the public
interest, and whether or not the applicant had fulfilled the interconnection requirements. 12 2 The Commission could impose up to a six month delay on any
RBOC's entry into the interLATA market if the
Commission felt that the RBOC had not met the interconnection requirements. 2 8 However, for five
years after the enactment of the bill, the FCC would
be prohibited from seeking injunctive relief, under
any law, to stop RBOCs from providing interexchange service through a subsidiary. 24
Senator Pressler stated that the committee wanted
severe penalties to govern RBOCs entry into currently prohibited markets under the 1982 Consent
Decree.12 5 The draft contains a one million dollar,
per offense penalty provision for RBOCs that fail to
meet the interconnection requirements within the
first three years after enactment. 2 6 After three years,
RBOCs found to be "willfully, knowingly and without good cause" violating the separate subsidiary requirement, could be fined up to 500 million dollars
... Pressler Releases Telecom 'Discussion Draft' VDT Applications Would Undergo One-Year Freeze, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS, Feb. 6, 1995, at 1.
I's

Id.
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Id.
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Id.

The application must contain the nature and scope of the
proposed service, each type of product or service market, and
each geographic market the RBOC proposes to serve. Id.
122 Id. at 2.
121

,12

Id.

Id.
1*5 Prepared Statement by the Honorable Larry Pressler,
Committee Chairman; Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
,14
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initially, and 250 million for each additional violation within three months thereafter.' 27 Private parties would be allowed to seek treble damages against
District Court would impose
a violation. A 2U.S.
8
these penalties.'

Under the Act, the cable-telco cross ownership
prohibition would be lifted.12

9

Common carriers

would be able to provide video programming directly
to subscribers in their telephone service area.'3 0
Common carriers providing video programming
through VDT services would not be required to file
for a franchise license. Carriers providing traditional
cable television service on a non-common carrier
type system would be required to obtain a
franchise.'
The Democratic Leaders of the Senate proposed
an alternative plan.'8

2

The Democratic

proposal

would require FCC and DOJ approval before an
RBOC could enter into the competitive long distance
market. LECs would be able to provide cable television service immediately upon passage of the bill.
Under this proposal, price cap regulation would not
be mandatory for any company competing in the local market. RBOCs are opposed to the Democratic
proposal, whereas IXCs support it.'8 s
On June 8, 1995, the United States Senate began
debate on the telecommunications reform bill (S-652)
which developed from the 1995 Act.' 3 One week
later, on June 15, the bill was passed by a resounding 81-18 vote.' 8 In relation to local telephone competition, much of the bill followed the proposals in
the 1995 Act. The senate voted down an amendment
which would give the DOJ an equal say in approval
or denial of RBOC entry into MFJ restricted services."1 However, the senate di pass an intraLATA
dialing parity amendment.' 37 The amendment delays
a requirement that the RBOCs offer intraLATA dialing parity for three years.'18 The same agreement
restricts the three dominant IXCs, AT&T, MCI and
Sprint, from offering both local and long distance
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Id.
See Pressler Releases Telecom Draft, supra note 117, at
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Id.

1"7

2.
Id.
Id.
Senate Democrats Have Alternative Legislative Proposal
102
Making it More Difficult for RHCs to Enter InterLATA Markets; Bipartisan Bill Sought, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS,
Feb. 20, 1995, at 4.
10

101

13

Id. at 4-5.

Administration Opposes Pressler Bill as Senate Debate
Starts, COMM. DAILY, June 8, 1995, at 1.
Senate Passes Telecommunications Legislation, COMM.
10'
184

service in the same area for three years. The senate
rejected an amendment that would have forced the
RBOCs to sell services to competitors at below
cost."3 9 The fact that the bill was passed in one week
despite controversial issues illustrates the great need
for legislative reform in the telecommunications
industry.
IV. THE FUTURE OF LOCAL EXCHANGE
COMPETITION
Telecommunications is a field driven by technology. Once the consumer realizes a new type of service is available or even possible, they will begin to
think of ways to apply that service. Soon, a service
that did not exist a short time earlier is not only in
demand, but nearly indispensable. Ten years ago,
cellular phone service was practically non-existent.14 Today, many people rely on cellular service
as an integral part of their business and personal affairs.1 ' This is only one illustration of how quickly
the telecommunications market changes.
A problem arises when the development of industry regulations fails to keep up with technological
progress. Nowhere is there a more glaring example
of this than the United States telecommunications industry, an industry that currently operates under a
statute created in 1934.142 While this statute affects a
great deal more than the local loop its failings become apparent when addressing the barriers to local
telephone competition.
The FCC order mandating physical collocation as
the means for competitive interconnection to LEC
networks was an attempt by the FCC to operate in
the public interest and foster local competition. ' s
The D.C. Circuit's decision to vacate the order on
constitutional grounds need never have been reached
if the FCC had a clear statutory power to order
June 16, 1995, at 1.
Senate Votes Small Role for Justice Dept. in Lifting
MFJ, COMM. DAILY, June 14, 1995, at 2.
Senate Passes Telecommunications Legislation, supra
137
note 135, at 3.

DAILY,
186
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See Primers-CellularRadio, TELECOMMUNICATIONS

REGULATORY MONITOR, Aug. 1986, at 3-27. (discussing the
state and development of cellular radio as of 1986, two years
after its inception).
140

Id.
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-713 (1993).

140

Expanded Interconnection, supra note 33, para. 16.
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physical collocation."' While this decision did not
bring competition in the local loop to a halt, it did
serve to illustrate the incapacity of the 1934 Act to
address modern telecommunications issues effectively. There is simply no way the drafters of the Act
could have predicted the state of today's telecommunications industry in the 1930s."4"
RBOCs have controlled the local exchange telephone market since the 1982 Consent Decree broke
14 6
AT&T's monopoly into seven smaller monopolies.
Technology has made it possible to open the local
market to competition, and has in fact already done
so, in significant areas. Many regulations meant to
foster competition at the time they were adopted
have become burdensome to the development of competition in the local exchange market in light of eco7
nomic and technological developments."
The RBOCs still have market power in the local
loop; however, it is inevitable that the increase in use
of alternative communications systems will significantly detract from LEC revenues. If the LECs try
to compensate by raising access charges, they will
encourage the use of bypass systems and alternative
local exchange carriers. In order to remain viable,
the RBOCs need to be able to diversify. Some, like
Frontier and Ameritech, are willing to concede their
local monopoly in order to achieve diversification.
Other RBOCs seem as though they would hold onto
their monopolies and deter competition as long as
possible, while expanding into fields not restricted to
them. Whether they are willing to concede their local
monopolies or -not, federal telecommunications re144

Id.

14'

Larry Irving, Steps Toward a Global Information Infra-

structure, 39

FED.

COM. L.J. 271,272 n. 5 (1994); Secretary Ir-

ving states that while "piecemeal revisions" have been made to
update communications legislation over the years no comprehen-

sive revision has been made since 1934. Id.
146 Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by
Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommu-

nications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1983).
"" One example of this proposition involves the 1984 Cable
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form legislation stands to drastically alter the environment in which local exchange telephone service
providers operate.
V.

CONCLUSION

The local telephone monopoly has become obsolete. There are a number of fast moving savvy competitors vying for a piece of the LECs market. The
CAPs want equal access. Wireless technology is advancing quickly. Cable companies are positioning
themselves to compete directly with the LECs. Some
LECs want to exchange their local monopolies for a
ticket into the long distance market. The IXCs
would like to hold the LECs at bay for as long as
possible.
It has become apparent that competition in the local telephone exchange is in the best interest of consumers. It has also become apparent, if only through
viewing the legislative and regulatory proposals, that
in order to succeed competition will have to be
closely regulated. Congress, the FCC, and State
Public Utility Commissions have drawn the perilous
task of finding the right mix of regulation and competition to best serve the public interest and maintain
a viable local telephone system. It has become imperative for the advancement of telecommunications into
the twenty first century that these government entities work together to design a plan that will function
practically and efficiently.
Cross Ownership Ban. The legislatures' primary goal in prohibiting local telephone companies from owning a cable franchise in
their service area was to keep the telcos form cross subsidizing
and monopolizing the cable industry. However although cable
companies have grown to the point where it would be very difficult for a telephone company to run them out of business
through cross subsidization the prohibition is still intact. See,
e.g., In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 71 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 70 (1992).

